When the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes on Iran on February 28 under Operation Epic Fury, the consequences were never going to stay contained within Iran's borders.
Within days, the conflict had spilled into one of the world's most critical maritime arteries.
By March 2, tanker tracking data told the story plainly: no ships were broadcasting AIS signals in the Strait of Hormuz, traffic had fallen to essentially zero, and war-risk insurers had withdrawn cover entirely, making the economic case for transit impossible even for operators willing to run the risk.
Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has since declared the stranglehold on shipping a "tool to pressure the enemy," with no resolution on the horison.
The disruption is staggering in scale. The Strait carries roughly 20% of the world’s daily oil supply, with China, India, Japan and South Korea accounting for nearly 70% of shipments. About 30% of Europe’s jet fuel supply originates from or transits through the waterway.
For South Africa, sitting at the southern tip of Africa with two major ports and a long coastline, the question was immediate: does this crisis represent an opportunity?
Cape Town’s port has already recorded a 112% surge in diverted vessels since early March, according to the Cape Chamber of Commerce. Major carriers such as Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd have formally rerouted their fleets around the southern tip of Africa, marking this as more than a temporary detour and more of a structural shift. What was once a contingency route has suddenly become the main artery for east–west trade.
Why South Africa? With the Strait of Hormuz closed and Houthi forces again attacking ships through the Red Sea, vessels leaving the Persian Gulf for Europe and North America have no real alternative but to sail around Africa. Even Oman’s deep-water ports (once proposed as a regional workaround) have been listed as war-risk zones following drone strikes earlier this month. The Cape route, though longer and more expensive, is now seen as the only safe option.
Yet South Africa's port authority paints a more cautious picture. Transnet National Ports Authority (TNPA) have noted that despite global carriers reassessing routes following the Hormuz closure, there has been no notable spike in berthing requests at local ports, including Cape Town – suggesting that while significantly more ships are rounding the Cape, few are actually stopping.
In shipping, as in economics, proximity is not the same as participation: a tanker that sails past without berthing generates no port revenue, no bunkering income and no economic activity for South Africa. Most of the diverted tankers are very large crude carriers (VLCCs) on long hauls – they bunker for the full voyage and have no operational need to stop in South Africa. They sail past. The economic benefit to South Africa from a ship that rounds the Cape without stopping is essentially zero.
South Africa finds itself in a peculiar position: at the centre of the world's most important rerouting event in decades yet struggling to demonstrate it can convert that geography into economic benefit.
Moreover, the infrastructure constraints at Cape Town and Durban ports are well documented – inefficiency, congestion, equipment failures and labour disputes have consistently ranked South African ports near the bottom of global port performance indices in recent years.
The 112% surge in Cape diversions documented by the Chamber of Commerce tells one story. The TNPA's confirmation that berthing requests remain unremarkable tells another.
There are, however, early signs that South Africa recognises the scale of what is at stake. In December 2025 (just months before the Hormuz crisis broke) Transnet signed a 25-year concession agreement with International Container Terminal Services Inc. (ICTSI) of the Philippines to manage and upgrade Durban Container Terminal Pier 2, the country's busiest container hub.
ICTSI has committed R11 billion to the facility, with the explicit mandate to modernise operations, improve efficiency and expand capacity. It is exactly the kind of long-term, capital-backed public-private partnership that port reform advocates have argued South Africa needs for decades. That it was concluded before the current crisis makes it more credible, not less – it was a structural decision, not a panic response.
Nonetheless, Durban is one port, and Pier 2 is one terminal within it. The ICTSI concession is a step in the right direction, not a solution to the whole. Cape Town (the port most directly positioned on the Cape route, the first major call for vessels rounding the southern tip) has no equivalent arrangement in place. If the Durban model demonstrates anything, it is that private sector capital and operational expertise can move the needle where decades of state management have not.
Whether South Africa is positioned to capitalise on this moment – to attract bunkering business, port calls, ship repair and logistics revenue from a global fleet now sailing past its front door – is ultimately a question about port competitiveness and infrastructure readiness, not geography.
Geography has done its part. The rest is up to Transnet.
