A few loopholes as Security 108 gets into gear

Although the implementation procedure of the Part 108 security legislation for air cargo has been relatively painless for the air cargo industry, according to Bob Garbett, MD of Professional Risk Management and chairman of the Business Aviation Association of SA (Baasa), there are still potential gaps in the security chain. While he patted the South African Civil Aviation Authority (Sacaa) inspectors on the back for their close co-operation and hard work during the initial phase, he felt that there was still a way to go before the whole system was as foolproof as it was meant to be. One example is that the Sacaa is not yet applying strict compliance inspections. “But,” said Garbett, “we are advised that this will happen shortly.” He also noted that, although the requirement for formal hand search training was introduced four weeks ago – with Category 12 dangerous goods training necessary along with a formal hand search training course – the regulation was not fully up and running. “The contents and curriculum of the latter are presently being considered by the Sacaa,” said Garbett. “In the meantime, the authority accepts that hand search can be executed without formal training – on condition that training is given at the first possible opportunity.” And, while there are currently over 50 “regulated agents” (excluding the branches of these agents) and 19 “known consignors” shown on the Sacaa website, this public display of names has also been challenged. “The authority,” said Garbett, “has been formally requested to remove the list of known consignors from its website as this is not only a security risk, but could also be a source of sales leads.” He also suggested that – with the numbers of known consignors steadily increasing – this will be putting great strain on the time resources of the Sacaa inspectorate. “This trend,” Garbett added, “will continue for many months to come, and will eventually result, in my view, in consignor validators outside the Sacaa being appointed.” Another concern is the question of the use of X-ray by air carriers (and certain forwarding agents), as an exclusive – or stand-alone – security control. “X-ray cannot detect certain kinds of explosive and nor is it likely that X-ray screen monitoring personnel will be able to detect a well-disguised improvised explosive device (IED),” Garbett told FTW. “Compliance with the principles and provisions of International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Annexure 17 and Part 108 require that as much cargo as is possible is securityprocessed through a known and secure conduit from consignor to aircraft. “This compliance is the critical security factor which, if ignored or bypassed, voids the very purpose of the regulations.” “The application of only ONE active security control to make cargo known defeats the objective of these security measures.” The fact that not everyone in the air cargo chain has yet fully complied with the security demands of the regulations has also been noted as a concern by Baasa. “There are still fence sitters amongst agents, air carriers and consignors,” said Garbett. “But air cargo security requires the co-operation, vigilance and application of the integrated security principles contained in Part 108 by all concerned. The security chain should have no weak links - as one weak link affects all of us.” Garbett also pointed to training requirements having become confused. “It is unfortunate,” he said,“that certain aviation training organisations have chosen to advertise and conduct courses which are not required under Part 108.” He suggested that those looking for appropriate training courses should not be sold more than they need. The training requirements under Part 108, he told FTW, are simple and clearly defined in the guidebook to the regulations (See box above).